article Closed Access EN 1977-09-01

Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (l)

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 7, Issue 3, pp. 467–536 (1977)

DOI: 10.1080/00455091.1977.10717030

Abstract

Some philosophers, notably Professors Quine and Geach, have stressed the analogies they see between pronouns of the vernacular and the bound variables of quantification theory. Geach, indeed, once maintained that ‘for a philosophical theory of reference, then, it is all one whether we consider bound variables or pronouns of the vernacular'. This slightly overstates Geach's positition since he recognizes that some pronouns of ordinary language do function differently from bound variables; he calls such pronouns ‘pronouns of laziness'. Geach's characterisation of pronouns of laziness has varied from time to time, but the general idea should be clear from a paradigm example: (1) A man who sometimes beats his wife has more sense than one who always gives in to her. The pronouns ‘one’ and ‘her’ go proxy for a noun or a noun phrase (here: ‘a man’ and ‘his wife’) in the sense that the pronoun is replaceable in paraphrase by simple repetition of its antecedent.