article Open Access (green) EN 2015-03-28

Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service

IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. 60, Issue 11, pp. 2930–2944 (2015)

University of Groningen

DOI: 10.1109/tac.2015.2416924

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Abstract

The issue of cyber-security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of networked systems. In this paper, we analyze networked control systems in the presence of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the network. We characterize frequency and duration of the DoS attacks under which input-to-state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop system can be preserved. To achieve ISS, a suitable scheduling of the transmission times is determined. It is shown that the considered framework is flexible enough so as to allow the designer to choose from several implementation options that can be used for trading-off performance versus communication resources. Examples are given to substantiate the analysis.

Topics

Smart Grid Security and Resilience 1.00 Network Time Synchronization Technologies 1.00 Stability and Control of Uncertain Systems 0.99

Field: Engineering · Subfield: Control and Systems Engineering

Keywords

Denial-of-service attack,Computer science,Scheduling (production processes),State (computer science),Computer security,Networked control system,Stability (learning theory),Control system,Control (management),Computer network

All Available Versions

Landing page — IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control publishedVersion
Landing page — University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) publishedVersion other-oa
Landing page — Florence Research (University of Florence) submittedVersion
Landing page — University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) submittedVersion other-oa